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In early December, the U.S. President convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace deal. The commitment involved an end to long-standing fighting in the volatile eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Weeks later, however, a sharply contrasting strategy for instability emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, hitting sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President stated, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Change of Direction

This dichotomy encapsulates the core principle of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on trade and ending wars—despite the fact that this fits with the emerging aerial operations in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We have moved past viewing Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a high-ranking U.S. diplomat in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative stated this, saying the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Mixed Signals

This shift is consequential, but experts caution it is premature to assess its effects. The approach is influenced by the President’s personal style, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained an analyst for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Key decisions have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research estimates this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Geopolitical Neglect and Tensions

In contrast to his recent predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a vulgar slur, which he later acknowledged using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant dispute has erupted with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Engagement and Selective Action

An analogous tension flared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the forceful rhetoric may have spurred the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Competitors

Experts characterize the new U.S. approach as similar to that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the new approach likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.